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Abstract 
Since the mid-1990s, a number of governments in the global South have instituted programmes which 
provide regular cash grants to poor people. The results of cash transfer programmes have been impressed 
those searching for ways to improve welfare: the depth of poverty has been reduced, more children are 
being educated and vaccinated, and the poor are more likely to get jobs and start enterprises. Advocates of 
social democracy are hopeful that this heralds the possibility of comprehensive social protection. 
Experiments in welfare in the global South do not, however, inevitably signal an epochal shift to a 
postneoliberal era. They form part of an increasingly heterodox approach which combines an enduring 
emphasis on liberalised economic growth with bolder biopolitical interventions for the poor.  
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Development’s epiphany  
In 1995, when the Mexican GDP contracted by 6%, the newly elected government and World Bank 
advisors doubted that existing poverty alleviation measures were going to be enough for many vulnerable 
people to endure the crisis. Subsidies for tortillas and other staples were not reaching many of the rural 
poor, beneficiaries were not being identified consistently, distribution was subject to clientalism, and 
administrative costs were high (Levy, 2006; Molyneux, 2008). Besides, researchers were concerned that 
food provision schemes addressed only one of poverty’s many dimensions (Levy, 2006). So they tried 
something else. They established a programme to give money to the poor. The programme, initially 
known as Progresa and later Oportunidades, included a ‘scholarship’ for children who attended school 
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and obliged beneficiaries to visit clinics for health lectures and check-ups. In less than a decade, it 
reached a quarter of the Mexican population. It resulted in improved school attendance and completion, a 
reduction in malnutrition-related stunting, healthier children, and falling extreme poverty. Strikingly, 94% 
of the budget reached beneficiaries because running costs were low. 
 
Former World Bank president James Wolfensohn argues that, unlike the many successful development 
projects that are small and short lived, cash transfer programmes are able to benefit large populations over 
a sustained period of time (Foreword in Levy, 2006). Early innovations in Mexico, Brazil, Honduras and 
Bangladesh inspired cash transfer programmes in 45 countries in the global South, reaching 110 million 
families (Hanlon et al., 2010), and have even reformulated social policy in parts of the global North (Peck 
and Theodore, 2010). Although cash based welfare has a long history in the North, its uptake in the South 
has been described as a revolution (Barrientos and Hulme, 2009; Houtzager, 2008; The Economist, 
2012a).  
 
The bourgeoning literature on biopolitics draws attention to the kinds of mechanisms governments use to 
sustain the lives of populations living within their territories (Foucault, 2008; Hannah, 2012; Li, 2009; 
Ong, 2006). As the literature reviewed in this report shows, cash transfers have emerged as an important 
instrument in conducting development for the poor. In contrast to the sink-or-swim approach of market 
fundamentalism, or more proactive attempts to unleash the entrepreneurial power of the poor through 
micro-credit (Roy, 2010), cash transfers and other distributive mechanisms give form to more overtly 
‘pastoral’ relationships between states and populations (Huxley, 2007: 197). Support for these techniques 
of government comes not only from World Bank-aligned policy, which sees cash transfers as a means to 
re-orientate the poor to take responsibility for their own development, but also from those who see the 
potential for establishing distributive mechanisms to ameliorate the effects of globalisation and economic 
marginalisation. Critics, by contrast, argue that redistribution is limited by enduring commitments to 
liberalised economic growth, which compromise the ability of large numbers of people to escape poverty.  
 
Reproducing ‘surplus’ populations 
Rising wages and the appearance of large middle classes in the global South have vindicated, for many, 
the role economic growth in development. Kharas and Rogerson (2012) argue, for example, that 
economic growth will largely vanquish poverty in middle income countries by 2025. Yet against these 
enduring forms of market faith there has been a broad recognition that economic growth does not, in 
itself, translate into advances for many poor people. Bakker and Gill argue that the ‘extended power of 
capital’ is at odds with ‘progressive forms of social reproduction’ (Bakker and Gill, 2003: 18). They 
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identify a ‘crisis of social reproduction’ (Bakker and Gill, 2003: 28; also see Bezuidenhout and Fakier, 
2006: 462; Hunter, 2011: 1104) which stems from the inability of people to reproduce themselves through 
money wages, or through social wages (Hart, 2002) (on social reproduction also see Bakker and Silvey, 
2008; Katz, 2004; Roberts, 2008).  
 
A minority of working people in many parts of the world are waged or salaried employees, and many of 
those who are ‘surplus’ to the requirements of the labour market are self-employed in the informal sector 
(Denning, 2010; ILO, 2010). The welfare systems that did emerge in the global South during the 20th 
century produced limited groups of rights-bearing workers (Barchiesi, 2011; Chari, 2010; Ferguson, 
2009). Those beyond these social contracts manage risk within their families and social networks, with 
very little help from the state (Soares, 2012). According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
four fifths of the world’s population does not have access to social security (ILO, 2008). Furthermore, a 
waged or salaried job is no longer a certain route to inter-generational upward mobility. Trade 
liberalisation and the mobility of production have weakened the ability of workers to secure decent 
conditions from capital and consumers (Seekings, 2008b). Rather than participating in a secure 
proletariat, many are exposed to the uncertainty and hyper-exploitation of what is being called the 
‘precariat’ (Standing, 2011).  
 
In response, states and multilateral agencies have undergone a variety of ‘realignment[s]’ away from 
market orthodoxy (Leiva, 2008: xvii). This has been described by some as a Polanyian counter-movement 
which mitigates the dislocating effects of market expansion (Craig and Porter, 2006; Sandbrook, 2011; 
Watts, 2009). A host of other neologisms attempt to capture the various responses to the crises of 
unemployment and social protection since the 1990s: the Third Way, the post-Washington consensus, 
postneoliberalism, the new new deal, and neostructuralism. They are not synonyms, to be sure, all 
question the adequacy of the deregulated market. Some argue that neoliberalism has lost at least some of 
its ideological hegemony because of the exacerbation of poverty in the wake of liberalisation, the 
financial crisis following 2008 (Peck et al., 2009) and the fading power of the U.S. (Agnew, 2009). 
Keynesian social spending is no longer taboo (Smith, 2011) and there is solid commitment to un-
neoliberal principles such as ‘universal access to urban services’ (Parnell and Robinson, 2012: 608).  
 
Erstwhile advocates of the tough love of the market in the 1980s such as the World Bank have, since the 
1990s, recognised the need for interventionist poverty reduction (Craig and Porter, 2006; Roy, 2010; 
Ruckert, 2009; Taylor, 2009). Structural Adjustment Programmes morphed into Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers, which were, supposedly, drafted by recipient countries themselves rather than imposed, 
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and World Bank lending for social development increased as a proportion of loans (Vetterlein, 2012). 
Donors have come to accept that regular social transfers are more appropriate than emergency aid for 
populations whose vulnerability is not transient (Ellis et al., 2009). The most prominent collective 
commitment to tackling poverty has been the undertaking, in 2000, by all UN member states to meet the 
Millennium Development Goals by 2015 (Giovannini, 2008; Roy, 2008). Moderate Third Way 
governments, such as those led by Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil, Patricio Aylwin and Frei Ruiz-
Tagle in Chile, and Thabo Mbeki in South Africa, attempted to marry the objectives of social growth and 
social justice (Taylor, 2006). In the 2000s, popular frustration fuelled the success of parties further to the 
left, such as the Workers’ Party in Brazil (Cameron, 2009; Goldfrank, 2009; Grugel and Riggirozzi, 
2012). The more radical, including Venezuela and Bolivia, count themselves as experiments in 21st 
century socialism (Gibbs, 2006; Meltzer, 2009).  
 
Yet, for many commentators, there is no ‘sharp rupture’ (Leiva, 2008: xxxi) from neoliberalism to 
postneoliberalism (Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington, 2011; Hart, 2009) and some prefer to 
classify shifts since the 1990s as ‘inclusive neoliberalism’ (Craig and Porter, 2006: 63; Hickey, 2010) or 
‘roll-out neoliberalism’ (Peck et al., 2009: 106). Neoliberal globalisation has ‘relative ecological 
dominance’ (Jessop, 2010: 33) as a result of the path established by neoliberal reforms (Taylor, 2009). 
Although parties in power might be less expressly neoliberal, there are nevertheless on-going processes of 
neoliberalization (Brenner et al., 2010). New left governments continue to rely on many of the 
macroeconomic frameworks established under more explicitly market oriented regimes (Macdonald and 
Ruckert, 2009; Webber, 2009). Grugel and Riggirozzi (2012: 6) suggest that the primary difference 
between neoliberalism and postneoliberalism is ‘in government attitudes to the poor and discourses of 
citizenship rather than economic management as such’ (also see Brand and Sekler, 2009). The result is a 
heterodox mix in which the state attempts to harness existing socio-economic platforms to incorporate 
marginalised groups (Luna and Filgueira, 2009). However, breezy win-win narratives finesse what Leiva 
calls a ‘heterodox paradox’ (Leiva, 2008: xxvii) in which attempts to address the needs of the poor are 
limited by the demands of affluent groups and capital.  
 
Throw money at the problem  
Within this heterodox milieu, the introduction of cash-based social policy measures has assumed a variety 
of forms. The most popular are those that target the most vulnerable parts of the life cycle: grants for 
children and pensioners transform those who are normally dependents into breadwinners (Bähre, 2011). 
Income protection for working age adults is a more difficult sell. A vociferous campaign for a universal 
basic income grant in South Africa has failed despite chronic levels of unemployment (Seekings, 2008a). 
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Argentina is relatively unusual for having introduced a cash transfer for the unemployed in the wake of its 
2001 collapse (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012). Ethiopia and India, rather, give cash to unemployed 
individuals through public works programmes (Hanlon et al., 2010; Li, 2009). In targeting welfare, states 
use various kinds of means testing or geographic targeting that ‘delimit ‘the poor”’ as a homogenized 
beneficiary group (Williams et al., 2012: 995). Policy debates revolve around inclusion errors and 
exclusion errors: in their efforts to avoid paying those considered not poor enough, means tests run the 
risk of excluding those who are in fact struggling to survive. Yet regardless of intended patterns of 
inclusion, Gupta’s ethnographic analysis of the workings of bureaucracy in India (2012) shows the 
alarmingly arbitrary way in which individuals access social protection.  
 
Nevertheless, cash transfers have resulted in the improvement of bureaucratic capacity. Some countries 
such as South Africa have dramatically improved birth registration (Lund, 2012). However, since more 
than a third of births worldwide are not registered, many states are contracting information corporations to 
develop biometric registration systems in order to stabilise information on the populations they govern 
(Szreter and Breckenridge, 2012). A new biometric identity scheme launched in India aimed to register 
200 million people by the end of 2012 to enable the extension of social security (The Economist, 2012b). 
As Breckenridge argues, these technologies occupy an ambiguous position in that they appear to be 
coercive and also represent the possibility of reducing patronage-based distribution and achieving much 
higher levels of coverage than would otherwise be possible (Breckenridge, 2005).  
 
Although advocates of cash transfers generally stress that they are not a panacea for all social ills, they do 
attribute a number of advances to cash transfers. They have helped to reduce income inequality (ILO, 
2011; Soares et al., 2010), the depth of poverty has fallen (Woolard and Leibbrandt, 2010) and some 
households have been able to escape poverty (Lloyd-Sherlock et al., 2012). Cash transfers have improved 
household consumption (Soares et al., 2010) with associated improvements in nutrition and expenditure 
on children (CASE, 2008; Hanlon et al., 2010). Cash transfers may result in lower rates of child labour 
(Soares et al., 2010). School attendance has increased and dropout rates have decreased. Health and 
nutrition measures have improved. Many schemes claim gender empowerment by, for example, 
countering tendencies to keep girls out of school (Molyneux, 2008) or by making benefit payments 
through women, with the rationale that women are better stewards of the money than men, and that this 
may improve the power of women in households (ILO, 2011).  
 
Mindful that cash transfers might be regarded as little more than charity (e.g. Woolcock, 2012), advocates 
attach much importance to the way in which they facilitate income-generating activity, through both 
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entrepreneurialism and employment. Economists argue that poverty creates risk aversion, and a regular 
income provides safer conditions to take the risks needed to start businesses (Levy, 2006). It may provide 
micro-capital or leverage for micro-finance to establish enterprises (Hanlon et al., 2010). Enterprises are 
more viable because local demand increases from households that now have more cash to spend. In South 
Africa, pensions to women over 60 free up working age mothers to look for work (Posel et al., 2006). 
Cash transfers, therefore, aim to engender long-term autonomy as well as help meet short-term 
consumption needs. 
 
This aim becomes even more explicit when cash transfers entail conditions. Many (although not all) 
schemes are classified as conditional cash transfers because they require beneficiaries to fulfil specified 
conditions in order to continue receiving grants. Those who would otherwise be concerned about 
dependency on hand-outs might be appeased by the fact that recipients have to ‘earn’ their grant by 
keeping their children in school and having them vaccinated (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009; Levy, 2006). 
The result of improved education, health and civic responsibility will be improved human capacity and, 
therefore, populations that are able to advance themselves over the long term. Conditional cash transfers 
are, then, a form of governmentality which enable authorities to try to ‘shape the conduct of diverse actors 
without shattering their formally autonomous character’ (Miller and Rose 2008: 39) (also see Hossain, 
2010; Li, 2007). Modest cash transfers give households the freedom of consumers to meet some of their 
needs, but place expectations on them that they will find exit routes from poverty by making good health, 
education and civic choices to become more capable of earning an income (Hickey, 2010).  
 
This is consistent with the rhetoric of ‘economic freedom’ which underpins other kinds of interventions 
such as microfinance (Roy, 2010: 21). As Roy points out, these notions of freedom are normative in that 
they expect the poor to behave in ways that will improve their human capacity and earnings. Behavioural 
economists such as Thaler and Sunstein advocate the use of mechanisms to ‘nudge’ people to make better 
choices, and call this model ‘libertarian paternalism’ (2008: 5). But these are crude tools with complex 
outcomes. Children in Brazil might attend school because of conditions imposed, but they perform below 
par (Soares, 2012). Without concomitant increases in budgets for services, incentives to get people to use 
services simply results in overcrowded and understaffed schools and healthcare facilities. Furthermore, 
grant conditions may undermine rather than advance gender empowerment as they affirm ‘more 
“traditional” divisions of labour and responsibility’ such as motherhood, and force women to jump 
through hoops to access their benefits (Molyneux, 2008: 38). Much like many of the rationales behind 
microfinance, this essentialises gendered roles such as caring, maternal and responsible women in 




Upon his election to the presidency of the World Bank in 2012, Jim Yong Kim confirmed the Bank’s 
commitment to distributional interventions to tackle poverty. However, this does not signal mainstream 
development’s abandonment of neoliberalism for welfarism. Proponents of free markets have always 
been reconciled to the need to intervene in the case of market failure (Collier, 2012; Esping-Andersen, 
1999). In managing market failure, these policies do not aim to decommodify people; that is, to reduce 
their dependence on the market (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Taylor, 2009). The appearance of cash based 
forms of social support is appealing to some economists not as a route to establishing more extensive 
redistribution but simply as a way of allowing support to become demand driven rather than supply 
driven (Kharas and Rogerson, 2012). Grant payments are, by design, too modest to address poor 
households’ needs fully. In a cover story announcing the welfare revolution in Asia, The Economist 
insisted that Asian governments had learned from the mistakes of other welfare experiments and ‘have 
little desire to replace traditions of hard work and thrift with a flabby welfare dependency’ (2012a: 9).  
 
An un-Fordist compact?  
While advocates of liberalised economic growth cautiously embrace cash transfers, those more of a more 
social democratic orientation hope to install a global social contract which help governments meet basic 
human rights and achieve social justice (ILO, 2008). The ILO and other organisations have launched the 
‘Social Security for All’ campaign which proposes a ‘global social protection floor’. Cash transfers would 
form part of a package of cash and service based mechanisms to put in place a ‘virtuous circle of 
development that provides an exit route from poverty’ (ILO, 2011: 12). The ILO argues that even 
relatively poor countries can afford to make progressive improvements to the coverage and quality of 
social protection over time through their own revenue and with the support of international donors (ILO, 
2008). But, most of the world’s poor are now located in middle income countries (Sumner, 2012) with 
increasing financial resources to devote to poverty reduction. Famously, the Bolsa Família in Brazil costs 
0.5% of the GDP, reaches a quarter of the population and has has contributed to a reduction in income 
inequality (Palma, 2011).  
 
There is now a vocal lobby which argues that social protection can become redistributive if it is made to 
reach progressively more people with more money and services (Adésínà, 2007; Barrientos and Hulme, 
2009; Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2004; Hanlon et al., 2010; Mkandawire, 2004; Vellinga, 2007). 
This lobby rejects the need for conditions, which it argues are redundant anyway. The South African 
Child Support Grant, which does not have conditions attached, shows that school attendances have 
improved as a result of cash alone (Hanlon et al., 2010; Lund et al., 2009). Some are also in favour of 
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universal grants, and against means testing which has long been criticised by social democrats for 
stigmatising the poor (Adésínà, 2007). The possibility of ‘social democracy for the tropics’ (Leftwich, 
2005: 597) appears, for some, to be on the cards (also see Sandbrook et al., 2007; Vellinga, 2007).  
 
Yet contemporary projects for social democracy need to contend with very different circumstances to 
those of the 20th century in which the bounded national state was regarded as the appropriate 
geographical frame for mechanisms of distributional justice (Fraser, 2008). Trade liberalisation obviates 
the possibility of passing on the costs of good conditions of employment to investors and consumers 
(Seekings, 2008b). Financial liberalisation allows capital flight and the escape of what should be national 
wealth (Fine et al., 2011). Mass unemployment means more people living in poverty and proportionally 
fewer taxpayers, and therefore that welfare will be spread thinly over the large ‘residuum’. Although the 
contemporary development zeitgeist has given renewed priority to the problem of under-consumption, 
there is little interest in curbing over-consumption or instituting punitive redistribution. As demonstrated 
by literature reviewed in the first report in this series (Ballard, 2012), states regard successful 
accumulation by middle classes and elites as part of the good story of the economic growth and through 
which the global South is taking on a ‘developed’ status (also see Chatterjee, 2008).  
 
If new experiments in social policy do constitute a revolution then they might best be described with 
Gramsci’s notion of a ‘passive revolution’ (Morton, 2013), which entails top down responses to bottom 
up demands so that existing elites can manage the inclusion of marginalised groups rather than lose 
control as they would in a conventional revolution. Many programmes originated with progressive 
technocrats who, in their creation of schemes, bypassed not only the intended beneficiaries but also civil 
society and parts of government itself (Fenwick, 2009; Houtzager, 2008; Li, 2009; Lund, 2008). This top-
down emphasis does not negate the possibility of significant gains for the poor. Ferguson and Li have 
both argued that this moment represents an important opening for the implementation of life-sustaining 
distributional mechanisms, regardless of whether they might come from above or be recognisably 
neoliberal (Ferguson, 2007; 2009; 2012; Li, 2009).  
 
The poor do have political influence, to be sure. Parties that intend to gain or retain power need to 
confront poverty in visible ways. They use distribution systems to ward off ‘extremism’ (Li, 2009) and 
‘contain dissent’ (Hart, 2006: 991). Yet, as Boito (2010) argues in the case of Brazil, the power of the 
poor is limited because they hand responsibility for improvements to the state. The extent to which social 
movements and other popular groupings mobilise around the protection, design, implementation and 
uptake of systems of social protection will determine whether or not cash transfers become a site of 
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‘biopolitical struggle’ (Chari, 2010). This, and other forms of development by the poor, will be the subject 
of the final report in this series.  
 
Conclusion 
Cash transfers have been championed by a social justice lobby which recognises that the poor do not bear 
complete responsibility for their poverty and that universal, non-conditional and increasingly generous 
distributional systems are required to achieve social justice and human rights. However, as literature on 
postneoliberalism shows, there is no easy return to the welfare state’s ‘ascending road of social 
betterment’ (Titmuss, 1958: 34) after the detour of neoliberalism. Cash transfers have also been enfolded 
within mainstream development approaches which locate responsibility for transcending poverty upon the 
poor themselves and use grants to alter the behaviour of the poor. Enthusiasm for what Roy (2010: 73) 
calls ‘the democratization of capital’ obscures important truths such as the way in which poverty is 
produced, and the way in which women are burdened with the responsibilities for poverty. The role of 
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